Preliminary report on TERRA II's evidence-based policy advice

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TERRA II is a European project which began in 2014 as a follow up to TERRA I, which ran from 2012. Both TERRA projects have been financed by the European Commission, DG Home Affairs. TERRA I focused on gathering the knowledge on radicalisation and terrorism which is contained in the academic world and in the experiences of professional, former extremists and victims of terrorism, and rendering it in a format which can be used on a daily basis by professionals who come into contact with potentially vulnerable populations.

TERRA II is composed of three pillars. It will create a training of trainers which will ensure the dissemination of knowledge gathered by TERRA I to front line professionals, where it can be of most value; it will deliver a citizenship education curriculum for secondary school pupils and it will deliver state-of-the-art evidence-based policy advice to local and national governments of European member states about counter extremism including the prevention of radicalisation and de-radicalisation within their local and national population.

Regarding TERRA's policy advice to local and national governments of European member states, we consider it crucial that policy makers within these local and national governments can implement our advice under the security of the term 'evidence-based'. A preliminary research process, which will be described in this document, defined what we mean exactly by evidence based, how rigorous our criteria for using this term need to be, and finally, how and where TERRA II will go about gathering the evidence base on which the policy advice will be formulated.

Methodology

We began with a literature review. The main list of articles, books and other documents was derived from PsycInfo (Ovid). Since literature on evidence-based policy yields an undirected span of topics, we limited the search to reflect TERRA's primary areas of interest. We created a list with primary search terms, directly related to evidence-based policy, secondary search terms, comprised of the target groups of TERRA II, including front line professionals dealing with potentially vulnerable individuals and groups, victims of terrorism and former radicals and tertiary search terms, procedures related to evidence-based policy. Appendix 1 gives our search terms. Peer-reviewed articles, published between 2000 and 2015 in all journals, were included in our search. Articles were screened for relevance on abstract and title. References in articles and other documents have led to a snowball effect and cherry picking. Finally, we consulted several books that cover evidence-based policy to gain more knowledge about general ideas on evidence-based policy advice.

Defining evidence-based policy

A useful definition of evidence-based policy advice has been cited by Nutley *et al*. who define that the approach of evidence-based policy and practise 'helps people make well-informed decisions about policies, programmes, and projects by putting the best available evidence from research at the heart of policy development and implementation' [i]. Tony Blair promoted a more practical definition on evidence-based policy when he used the election slogan 'What matters is what works' [ii]. This slogan implies that policy advice is 'evidence-based' if recommended practices are based on scientifically and analytically proven effectiveness [iii] [iv]. In addition, Lum

et al. stress that counter-terrorism policies are evidence-based when scientifically effective interventions and treatments are implemented. Their literal definition states that 'evidence-based counter-terrorism policies are those policies which not only show promise in achieving outcomes sought, but at the same time do not cause harm' [v]. In other words, programmes should be assessed according to their effectiveness, or, conversely, their ineffectiveness and possible harmfulness [vi].

Hence, it is safe to say that scientifically proven effectiveness of policies and practices that prevent radicalisation is a crucial aspect of policy advice. Therefore, evaluations of policies and practices should be given the space to directly influence policy advice. However, more knowledge is necessary to formulate policy advice. A policy analysis is the best procedure for this phase allowing advice to be given about policy developments and implementations [vii]. It yields information about the probabilities that policies will be effective [viii], as well as additional practical information [ix]. Literature research and field research are both crucial procedures for a policy analysis [x]. A primary literature search (i.e. reviews of relevant research studies [xi][xii]) will deliver existing information on prevention of radicalisation. Additionally, systematic literature reviews, such as a Campbell systematic review, yield information about effectiveness of policies [xiii][xiv]. To obtain new information, however, one must conduct field research. A part of field research consists of interviewing experts and stakeholders [xv][xvi]. Needs assessments and survey studies are also effective means for field research that gathers expert and stakeholder views on the subject [xvii][xviii]. These kinds of consultations provide valuable information and will steer the policy analysis in the right direction. Furthermore, by analysing whether historical experiences with policies or practices were effective or ineffective in the past, one can assess the effectiveness of future policies [xix][xx][xxi]. Therefore, the assessment of trends and historic events can deliver predictions about future happenings, which can support prevention policies [xxii].

It is clear that a policy analysis can deliver valuable guidance for policy advice. Field and literature research should explain why and how problems have developed and accordingly how solutions (i.e. new policy) could address these problems [xxiii]. When Hoffman (2001) testified before US congress about counterterrorism, he stressed that effective counter terrorism policies are those policies that are implemented with a focus on and understandings of the problems and threat [xxiv]. Moreover, Nutley *et al.* propose that social policies become effective when information is provided about the problems, about what policies work, about how practices can be effectively implemented, about who is involved, about the needs of the target population and about why action is necessary [xxv]. Assessments of the feasibility of policies are extremely valuable as well [xxvi]. Striving to make this information about policies practical will also enhance evaluations of the policies at a later stage [xxvii].

Bearing in mind that policies are recommended as best practice based on their effectiveness and additional background information, and because evidence-based policy advice should support informed decision-making, it is also more than logical that several alternative policy options should be investigated, systematically compared and proposed [xxviii][xxix]. Probabilities of certain outcomes and several practices that lead to these outcomes should be taken into account. Decision makers can choose between these different actions by comparing these outcome

probabilities [xxx]. Alternative options can be additionally compared with costs and benefits analyses [xxxi] [xxxii]. Furthermore, risk assessments are desirable to come to a rational decision about which course can best be followed [xxxiii] [xxxiv], and combined with a cost-benefits analysis, it can be used to measure the likely effectiveness of policies [xxxv].

Finally, a certain attitude is crucial to the formulation of policy advice. Evidence-based policies are those interventions that are supported by information and research. In other words, opinions or political ideologies should not support implementation of these practices [xxxvi] [xxxvii]. Moreover, the importance of transparency about the goals and the procedures to obtain these goals is stressed when one recommends evidence-based practice [xxxviii] [xxxix].

As is usually the case with most social issues, opening the latter lines of reasoning is accompanied by a number of legitimate limits. A main issue is that policy and practice decisions are sometimes based on the *best* available evidence that exists about 'what works' [xl]. One can mainly presume the effectiveness of policies, based on the assumption that it is difficult to create certainty when one deals with complex social systems [xli]. The lack of perfect evidence seems even more the case when it comes to research on radicalisation or terrorism. Research on terrorism and data regarding prevention of radicalisation are often confidential [xlii]. There are also no fixed standards to obtain evidence. For example, several articles have proposed delivering evidence, but did not use quantitative or qualitative methods to obtain this evidence. In addition, several statements regarding radicalisation have been copied from statements that other experts have made. These statements are, however, often not empirically tested [xliii]. Besides, it is especially difficult to detect preventive effects. Next to empirical limits, one must also bear in mind that other factors such as, ideologies, personal experience, politics, etc. can influence policy implementations [xliv].

TERRA II's evidence-based policy advice

TERRA II will formulate evidence-based policy advice to European member states based on literature and field research on radicalisation and the policies and practices that have been shown to be most effective to prevent this phenomenon. The latter statement corresponds with several definitions that are derived from the literature about 'evidence-based policy'. Within these definitions, a consensus is found in the 'evidence-base' theory that the effectiveness of policies and practices should be scientifically proven. TERRA II adopted the definition of Lum *et al.*, who proposes that 'evidence-based counter-terrorism policies are those policies which not only show promise in achieving outcomes sought, but at the same time do not cause harm' [xlv]. Recommendations of policies and practices will therefore be based on evaluations of their effectiveness and conversely ineffectiveness and possible harmfulness [xlvi].

Note that TERRA II additionally refers to the terms 'evidence-informed', 'evidence-influenced', 'evidence-aware' and 'evidence-inspired' policy advice [xlvii], in order to deal with the restrictions of the term 'evidence-based'. Despite the limits that the term 'evidence-based' entails, TERRA II will create evidence-based policy advice, based on the best possible evidence, while being aware of the limits and therefore stressing the importance of the development of improved research methods in the field of terrorism and radicalisation studies [xlviii].

Thus, which policy to advise becomes clear from interpreting the definitions of evidence-based policy: TERRA II will recommend scientifically proven effective practices. However, how does one know which practices are effective? To answer the most prominent question 'what works?' [xlix], policies and therefore practices should be qualitatively or quantitatively evaluated regarding their effectiveness and impact [l][li]. These evaluations can lead to 'best practices' [lii]. Stern *et al.* plead that the effectiveness of policies should also be evaluated during and after they are implemented [liii].

TERRA's results will be obtained with academic literature reviews and practical information gathering (i.e. needs assessment, country, programme and practices visits and interviews with experts) while striving to be unaffected by personal or political ideologies. The strategy and procedures that TERRA II will use to obtain all necessary information will be made available in order to promote transparency. Being transparent will not only increase the knowledge about the effectiveness of practices, but it will create knowledge about alternative policies and possible negative consequences as well [liv]. Furthermore, TERRA II will not only identify the most effective practices, but will also deliver practical and abstract background information about these practices (i.e. what is the current state of affairs regarding radicalisation, what problems do the advised policies and practices tackle, how they can be implemented, who should be involved and what tools are needed to evaluate these practices in the future). Since TERRA II is aware of the differences between European countries (e.g. culture and recourses) and the slogan 'no one size fits all', we will ensure that our advice is flexible and adaptable. In order to accomplish this, assessments about the feasibility of these policies and practices will be carefully taken into account.

Importantly, TERRA II will not shy away from being critical. Besides supporting effective practices, TERRA II will hold a critical attitude towards existing policies and practices [lv][lvi][lvii]. Questions, such as: 'What does not work?' and 'What needs to be changed?' will be answered [lviii]. Therefore, harmful side effects of interventions and treatments will be taken into account to prevent policies causing harm or being counter-productive [lix][lx]. Thus, the final document will deliver advice on possible harmful outcomes and issues that should be handled with care when these policies and practises are implemented.

Finally, it is important to note that TERRA's analyses will lead to policy *advice*. One must bear in mind that this advice, based on research, only acts as a guide for policy makers [lxi]. As Ballard *et al.* wisely suggest: 'Research, although important, is not a replacement for consistent and persistent vigilance by lawmakers, agency managers, and policy elites charged with countering the threats of terrorism' [lxii].

The following sections describe the results of TERRA's Needs Assessment, conducted in March 2015, and the methodology, which TERRA will now use to proceed.

The results of TERRA's Needs Assessment

In order to form the basis of the evidence based policy advice which will be created by TERRA II, we conducted a needs assessment amongst policy makers at local, national and European level, academic specialists in this field, front line workers, victims of terrorism and former radicals.

The overall purpose of this needs assessment was to gather opinions from amongst this expert group on which areas of policy on extremism, radicalisation and terrorism are the most in need of support through research and tailor made policy advice. We produced a questionnaire, initially to be circulated at a conference to which these target groups had been invited, and later to be more widely distributed via social media, email and site visits to selected European countries. The questions were designed to establish the background of the respondents, and their relationship with work and policy on radicalisation. They cover the nature of the problems around extremism, radicalisation and terrorism faced by the country represented, and how they have evolved over recent years. Best practices, obstacles to cohesive policy, awareness of European initiatives on the area, and suggestions on which areas of European funding are under researched were f explored.

The TERRA conference, "TERRA, Terrorism and Radicalisation, Evidence Based Policy," was held in Brussels on the 3rd of March 2015. Attendance was by invitation only. Participants included the permanent representatives from European member states, national politicians, front line workers including law enforcement personnel and teachers, former radicals and victims of terrorism. Many of the former radicals and victims of terrorism represented not only their own experiences with terrorism, but also groups and associations supporting the rights and needs of victims and former political prisoners.

The questionnaire will be further distributed to other potential respondents from the same target groups through social media and through the networks of the four participant organisations, Impact, the Quilliam Foundation, AV11M and University College Roosevelt.

The questionnaire was included in the conference package which was delivered prior to the conference, to allow the participants to familiarise themselves with its content before the event itself. Some respondents filled the questionnaire in before the conference and handed it in on the day. Most respondents filled it in during break out sessions in which five working groups were created. The participants were given fifteen minutes in which to complete the questionnaire, which was then handed in to the group chair. A working group discussion was then held, which took the form of a focus group with semi structured questions.

40 people filled in the initial questionnaire. Of these questionnaires one was incomplete.

Which organisation are you representing?
4 participants stated that they were not representing any organisation but were there as an independent participant. Organisations which were represented included, in no order:
- De Wolf training en advice (http://www.dwta.nl/)
- RAN, the Radicalization Awareness Network
- Intervict, University of Tilburg (https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/research/institutes-and-research-groups/intervict/)
- ISPI, Milan (http://www.ispionline.it/)

- University of Malmo (http://www.mah.se/english)
- Georgetown University (http://www.georgetown.edu/)
- University College Roosevelt (http://www.ucr.nl/Pages/default.aspx)
- UK Parliament
- The Dutch parliament
- European Parliament
- The DART centre Europe (http://dartcenter.org/europe)
- Coiste Na Niarchimi (http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/members/coiste-na-n-iarchimi)
- AIDA (http://aida.or.id/)
- ICCT (http://www.icct.nl/about)
- French Association of victims of terrorism (http://www.afvt.org/)
- The Quilliam Foundation (http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/)
- Strength to Strength (http://stosglobal.org/)
- Local governments from Denmark and the Netherlands
- Local police forces
- National police forces from the Netherlands and Belgium
- Hayat Germany (http://hayat-deutschland.de/)

What is your relationship with countering radicalisation, extremism and terrorism?
A total of 39 respondents classified themselves as follows:

Of the group who classified themselves as practitioners, the vast majority were law enforcement personnel. This bias may have weighted the responses to some question more in favour of repressive measures (see for example in the table on page 6 c.i. the high degree of awareness on targeted prevention, monitoring and surveillance). This bias should be borne in mind when reading the results of this needs assessment.

We had anticipated a larger response from policy makers at national and EU level, and intend to take further measures to compensate for this shortfall in the coming months. This will entail

contacting the relevant representatives, requesting that they complete the questionnaire and gathering this data either digitally or by means of an interview.

Does your organisation and initiative collaborate with other European initiatives working in this field?
The very fact that the respondents were present at the TERRA conference and filling in a questionnaire indicates that their organisation works together with TERRA, already a sign that they are involved in European initiatives

The majority of respondents, 25, noted that their organisations work with European initiatives, 10 said that their project did not, and 4 were unable to answer yes or no. Of the 25 respondent who answered yes, 8 responded that they were involved in RAN, the Radicalisation Awareness Network and 4 that they were affiliated to the Copra project (http://www.coppra.eu/). 3 responded that they were affiliated to Impact Europe (http://impacteurope.eu/). Individuals noted other European initiatives – these were: ISDEP (Improving Security by Democratic Participation http://www.isdep.eu/), SEPPRA (linked to COPPRA), Cepol (https://www.cepol.europa.eu/), TSN (no further explanation given), SSCAT (no further explanation given), the Foundation for Peace (http://www.foundation4peace.org/), and unnamed initiatives including former political prisoners in the Basque country and unspecified organisations in Northern Ireland, the UK, Spain, France, and other non EU countries.

These results reflect a high degree of awareness of cooperation at European level, and interest in participation with European initiatives.

What do you think are the three biggest challenges that your country is currently facing in regards to radicalisation, extremism and terrorism?
3 respondents did not answer this question.

Of the 36 respondents who did provide answers, some very clear trends emerged. The most challenging issue, named 9 times, was the issue of European citizens leaving to fight in foreign conflicts – how to work preventatively, and how to handle to issue of returnees. Integration, the lack thereof, exclusion, discrimination and poverty also received some attention, with integration being the most common of these to be put in first place. On the other side of the spectrum, social polarisation, with both Islamism and the rise of the right wing being specifically mentioned by 8 of the respondents.

3 respondents named the challenge of radicalisation on the internet.

12 respondents indicated that their country struggles the most with the approach of authorities to the problem of radicalisation. These responses spanned a broad focus, with 4 respondents saying that the main problem was a lack of leadership on the issue of counter terrorism, or a lack of explicit policy on it – or even at the most negative end of the spectrum supporting measures which were in fact counterproductive. 2 respondents noted that a lack of coordination in responses to radicalisation was the most pressing problem. 7 respondents called for more training for and coordination of front line practitioners, with one of these adding that more resources for this field were essential to successful approach.

2 respondents called for a lesser emphasis on repression and a greater emphasis on the teaching of active citizenship. A further 2 named specific security problems, the vulnerability of public spaces and the possibility of lone wolf attacks as key issues.

These answers can be amalgamated to form both a clear description of the problem, and to sketch proposed solutions. Social problems including the current economic climate, a lack of integration and discrimination are conspiring to create a situation in which the depature and potential return of foreing fighters is posing a major challenge to the European states, along with offshoot security concerns such as the threat from lone wolves and the general vulnerability of public places. This creates a bottleneck in which there is an urgencey for governments to respond swiftly and effectively to these problems, and a sense of frustration emerges from the questionnaires, as no coherent policy or response is forthcoming. In terms of solutions, the answers are also clear; more investment both in terms of actual resources but also in terms of awareness raising, coordination and training is required for front liners.

Have these challenges changed compared with 5 years ago?
9 respondents answered "no". 3 did not respond. 8 of those who chose "yes" stated that the main change in the last 5 years was the war in Syria and the foreign fighters who have left to join the conflict there, and a 9th added that this has in turn given rise to a backlash of right wing extremism. 10 respondents simply noted that the problem has increased, with 2 of those citing the internet as a key driver of this increase. 2 respondents noted that society has become more polarised, with one citing the financial crisis and a causal factor. Another commented unemployment and poor living standards are seen as creating political impasse. 1 respondent noted that repressive measures have intensified and another that the entire issure has become more sensitive. 1 respondent noted that there is now some sign of change in recognizing the Islamism is a problem for cohesion.

Are there institutions (eg universities, prisons, etc) in your country which have had more problems with extremism than others?
5 respondents did not answer. 10 people answered "don't know". 5 people stated that no institutions had particular problems. 4 respondents stated that prisons had more problem, with one respondent qualifying the answer by adding that there was a specific problem around the imprisonment of a specfic Islamist group. 7 respondents said that both universities and prisons had more problems, with one respondent adding that mental health institutions were also an issue. 3 respondents said that the problem was a geographical one, with problems concentrated in specific areas. 3 respondents said that schools has more of a problem.

Are you aware of specific programs, national or regional, to tackle radicalisation and extremism in your country?

1 respondent did not answer and 4 answered that they were not aware of any programmes. 33 answered that they did know of programs. 15 of these were non specific, citing train the trainer programs and generalised initiatives from local authorities. 2 respondents noted the TERRA program itself. 4 participants cited the COPPRA program. 3 respondents cited the SPP and PET system used in Denmark. 3 respondents named the British Prevent program (https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/protecting-the-uk-against-terrorism/supporting-pages/prevent) and the Channel program: (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118194/channel-guidance.pdf)

Inidividual respondents also named AVE (Against Violen Extremism http://www.againstviolentextremism.org/), the Radicalization Awareness Network, the Exit/ Hyat program http://www.exit-deutschland.de/english/) and PlanR (no web reference found).

Where does your country excel, in terms of countering radicalisation?

11 respondents left this section blank. A further 7 answered that they were not aware of any area in which their country excelled, with 1 adding that his country failed to excel. 4 respondents said that their country excelled in the hard side of counterterrorism with effective repressive measures. 6 respondents – all of whom from either Denmark or the Netherlands, stated that their country excelled in having a tolerant society and from successfully using a multi-agency approach. Respondents from the UK named the Prevent and Channel programs as successful. 2 respondents stated that their country had a lot of knowledge on the subject of extremism, or excelled in integrating this knowledge into policy. Individuals gave the following answers: the Coppra project, an unspecified prisons program, defending freedom of speech, good counter narrative approach, and a combination of hard and soft approaches.

What are the challenges to a cohesive national program on tackling radicalization and extremism in your country?

5 respondents did not answer. Most of the other answers were extremely diverse, with individuals calling for a broad range of changes. These included: citizenship education, or multicultural education to be made available in schools, including focus on resilience, less focus on repressive measures at national level, less focus in the media on the Islamist threat to the detriment of recognition of other threats including extremism supported by state actors, Islamophobia and the exclusion of Muslim communities by mainstream society and practical obstacles such as a lack of budget, knowledge and obstacles created by the justice system.

Some clusters did however emerge. 2 respondents noted that fear of seeming racist created a taboo around the problem or led to a lack of confident in discussing the issue. By far the largest cluster – of 18 respondents, gathered around answers focused on a simple lack of cohesive policy – this was attributed to a lack of political will, a lack of cross-party prioritization, and a lack of communication and coordination between groups of practitioners who would be carrying out the daily work connected to such a policy. 1 respondent added that any such collaboration may be hampered by the laws around the exchange of information between professional groups.

Is there an official representative in your country who champions the cause of counter extremism in the political arena?

10 participants did not respond. 7 responded that they did not know. 7 responded "no". 14 respondents gave names of ministries, those of home affairs, foreign affairs and justice and homeland security. 2 responded that all political parties had a designated expert. Individuals who were named included D. Schoof, national coordinator counter terrorism, interior minister Angelino Alfano and MPs Stefano Dambruoso and Andrea Mancuilli, Cabinet Minister Manu Sareen, academic Magnus Ranstorp, EU Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove and Lord Mayor of Rotterdam Ahmed Aboutaleb.

Are you aware of your country's initiatives in the following areas? Please tick all that apply.

Numbers of ticks are indicated here, from a total of 38 respondents – 1 did not complete this section.

a. Primary prevention	Yes (✔
i. Education	28
ii. Raising awareness of extremism and its causes	22
iii. Raising awareness of how best to counter extremism as a society	14
iv. Promoting human rights and pluralism	23
v. Countering extremist ideology	14
vi. Countering extremist narratives	12
vii. Interfaith work	17
viii. Other (please state) Cite: Prisons, training for social workers and women in the media.	3
b. Integration	
i. Community engagement and resilience building	21
ii. Community cohesion initiatives	20
iii. Addressing grievances	10
iv. Combating discrimination	30
v. Other (please state)	0
c. Targeted prevention	

i. Monitoring and surveillance	32
ii. Designated localities which receive more counter-extremism attention	21
iii. Tackling extremist networks	22
iv. Role of families and friends in intervention	13
v. Other (please state) Community oriented policing cited by one respondent. The other gave no further information.	2
d. De-radicalisation	
i. Exit programs	14
ii. Using formeer extremists	12
iii. Using non-violent extremists	10
iv. Using victims of terrorism	8
v. Rehabilitation and reintegration	12
vi. Other (please state) 3 respondents gave the following answers: professionals, derad mentoring and family counselling derad tool	6
e. Institutions	
i. Prisons	23
ii. Schools	20
iii. Universities	10

iv. Other (please state) 2 respondents gave no specification. 2 added health. Other answers were: Street level workers, local government, mosques, police and community organisations.	8
f. Online	
i. Negative measures (eg. censorship and take-downs)	16
ii. Monitoring and surveillance	26
iii. Positive measures (eg. counter speech)	12
iv. Other (please state) the single participant who responded positively referenced OSINT .	1
g. Training	
i. For civil servants and local government officials	21
ii. For police officers and prison officers	26
iii. For religious leaders	11
iv. For teachers and youth workers 1 respondent added that there was very little available and not of good quality.	19
v. For journalists	2
vi. Other (please state) No specification was given for either respondent.	2

The results of this table give clear indications of where awareness levels are high and where more attention could be focussed. In terms of prevention measures, initiatives which target specific institutions such as schools and prisons already seem to be high on the agenda, along with the use of repressive measures such as monitoring and surveillance – although this result may have received an extra weight due to the strong representation of law enforcement bodies

at the conference, as already noted. Attention for universities, however, was less well represented and there was a clear need for more attention for the "softer" prevention measures: awareness on countering extremism as a society, for example, interfaith work, countering extremist narratives and especially the role of families and friends in interventions. Another are which clearly emerges as in need of more attention is the whole area of de-radicalisation. Although several people mention Exit programs in the following question as being particularly impactful. Interfaith work and training for religious leaders were also both mentioned as being in need of extra attention.

Which of the above have particularly high impact? In what way?

17 participants gave no answer. Other answers were diverse, with the largest cluster of 7 respondents answering that training and awareness raising for front line workers, with teachers and youth workers specifically mentioned, is crucial, as these workers are key to prevention. 2 respondents answered that monitoring and surveillance measures were the most effective, and 1 participant contrarily suggesting that current counter measures are exacerbating the problem. 2 respondents identified de-radicalisation as the most impactful, specifically commenting that family counselling was very effective. 3 respondents said that all of these areas were important but one respondent added that all need to improve in quality and reach. Individual respondents added that all of sections A-D in the questions had immediate impact, that on points A II and III and C IV, specifically basic education, civic education and creating strong counter narratives, more could be done in schools and prisons, journalists, and creating a network of key figures in the community who can inform local government on the sentiments of the people in the community.

European Collaboration

What is an example of good practice in any of these areas listed above, operating outside your country? Would it work well in your country? What do you think are the barriers to implementing this good practice in your home country?

15 respondents provided no answer.

Some respondents gave more than one answer, in which case all answers are given. 6 respondents named Exit programs, 5 of whom specifically mentioning Exit Germany. This was felt to be a potential success in the home countries of the respondents, and potentially applicable to other forms of extremism than neo Nazi. The barrier could be that we would need formers who young people could relate to. 2 respondents named Hayat, Germany. These respondents felt that this was a program which could be successfully implemented in their home country, because it would need only a small budget and expands the possibilities beyond repression. Potential barriers were seen as political will and the danger that politicians and the media may perceive it as being too "soft". 3 respondents named TERRA. This was felt to be a potentially successful policy in the home country of the respondents, as it was practical and easily understandable, and opens a discussion which is often neglected. Potential barriers to its implementation may be a reluctance to discuss this, and a lack of collaboration and consistency amongst practitioners. 4 named COPPRA. This was already seen as a successful policy in the

respondent's home country, except for one Danish respondent, who felt that the police in Denmark were already "way ahead." 3 respondents stated that they specifically admired the Danish program, 1 focussing on its approach to foreign fighters, the other 2 naming its de-radicalisation programs. These aspects were seen as potentially successful in the respondent's home countries, especially the realisation that repression is "only one side of the coin.", but may be blocked by bureaucracy, a lack of cooperation between local authorities, and lack of budget. 2 respondents mentioned the high degree of integration in the Netherlands. This was seen as potentially successful in the respondent's home countries but may be hampered by a lack of political will/ attention (or even negative attention) and a lack of credible interlocutors. Individuals gave the following responses:

- In Belgium jihadists are not imprisoned together. This would work well in the respondent's home country, as the current policy of imprisoning them together can hamper de-radicalisation.
- Prevention (ISDEP) and de-radicalisation (Channel) from the UK. These would work well in the respondent's home country as prevention is still the most effective way to counter radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. This should also be extended to include an education program. However, a lack of interaction between police and social actors, possibly caused by a lack of trust, would pose a barrier to the implementation of this in the respondent's home country.
- Non specific capacity building and resilience programs, hampered by budget cuts.
- De-radicalisation programs using former extremists, as this is the best counter narrative. However, there is a judicial barrier.
- Civil society interaction with government. This method could be appropriate to other countries if adapted and contextualised but may be hampered by a lack of knowledge and a delicate political climate.
- RAN, this would work well in home country although it is hampered by communication issues.
- On-line anti-radicalisation.

Which areas of your country's policy on countering radicalisation, extremism and terrorism could be strengthened by European research and funding?

10 people did not respond. 8 respondents focussed on prevention, specifically mentioning support for and through the families of radicalising young people and practitioners. 1 respondent added the need to support former radicals working with young people. 6 respondents said that in their own country, all areas of this field needed support and stimulation. 2 respondents said that the focus should be on de-radicalisation. 2 answer that the focus should be on counter narrative. 4 respondents said that the focus should be on citizenship education or education in general. Individuals commented that the focus should be on: researching the impact of interventions, lone wolves, specifically on certain geographical areas, support of municipal knowledge, integration and issues related to foreign fighters.

TERRA

Are there aspects of the TERRA project and/or the work of the partner organisations which you have questions about?

29 respondents gave no answer, and 3 respondents "no". Answers were diverse, including how the positive results of the conference were going to be further spread out to "grass roots level" and how the participants can further support the project. 1 participant suggested that the policy recommendations be made as concrete as possible, and that the TERRA network should collaborate in sharing ideas of project proposals. 1 participant asked whether a united Europe at every level to counter radicalisation, extremism and terrorism at every level is a possible goal for TERRA. 1 participant commented on how problematic the issue of freedom of speech is. Who gets to decide who should be able to speak at universities etc. and who not? Many of the issues currently playing in international politics are too far removed from politicians in developed countries to understand them properly or justify any restriction on the freedom of speech.

Is there anything else you would like to comment on?

26 people did not supply an answer. 3 answered "no". 5 respondents took the opportunity to provide a compliment on the conference and speakers, and to offer further assistance. 1 participant noted that more psychological analysis would be helpful. 1 responded that the development of a Europe broad legislation in order to coordinate the efforts of European countries against radicalisation, extremism and terrorism would be ideal. 1 respondent urged us not to focus too much on political Islam, as broader movements towards political violence are afoot. 1 participant commented that they would like to exchange ideas further and one provided the suggestion that the next time more attention should be devoted to the exchange of best practices.

Conclusions

Participants feel that the current socio economic and political situation is creating an urgent need for a response from politicians and policy makers in terms of a cohesive and coordinated response – if possible, a cross border one. This should be further supported by training and resources for front liners. While there is a high degree of support for monitoring and repressive measures in general as being effective, there is a call to embed these more effectively in both hard and soft approaches, with more attention to be given to the spectrum of preventive measures, from citizenship education to increase democratic participation through to family support programs to support families of those at risk of radicalising. Participant's reaction to TERRA was very positive.

Methodology for the next phase of TERRA's research

The results of our definition study and needs assessment, the first two elements of TERRA II's research for evidence based policy advice are presented here. TERRA's research will now be further developed along the lines indicated by these initial processes. TERRA's final evidence base, from which its policy advice will be derived, will be the product of both field research and literature review.

The results of the needs assessment have given us clear indications as to how to structure our field research. Country visits were already on the agenda for TERRA's research, and the results gave some indications as to where we should direct our attention for these visits. Several European countries were named as already using programmes which were identified as best practice. These were the Exit/ Hayat program in Germany, the Danish Aarhus model, integration policies in the Netherlands, and Prevent in the UK. As preparation for these visits, official documents regarding these project will be gathered. A series of semi structured questionnaires will be developed by the TERRA research group, designed to deliver a clear, consistent and comprehensive response across the board of respondents.

Site visits will be conducted to these locations, during which interviews and focus groups will be held with the front line staff delivering these services, policy makers supporting them, and, where possible and appropriate, beneficiaries. In the event that other European practices are named as best practices during the further dissemination of the questionnaire, we may conduct two further site visits, which will be designed along the same structure. The results of this field research will be formulated into a series of recommendations. These will be designed to provide a blueprint of how to initiate and maintain these best practices, their approach and their delivery in other European countries.

 TERRA's original literature review was written at the outset of the TERRA project and will be further updated to reflect recent developments in the literature and include literature which focusses specifically on evidence based policy and government strategies to prevent radicalisation. Since out literature review was written in 2013 there have been significant developments on the world stage. The war in Syria has intensified, and a caliphate has been established, drawing unprecedented numbers of young people from Europe to join the conflict there. Online propaganda campaigns have proliferated and reached new levels both of brutality and sophistication. This updated review will focus on creating specific knowledge on which evidence based policy advice can be delivered, and on supplying the basis of the field research. This updated review will be made available during the course of 2015.

Once our policy advice has been written into a draft form, it will be presented at a meeting of the permanent representatives of the European Commission on the subject of radicalisation. It will also be presented to the members of TERRA's advisory board. Feedback will be invited from these groups. These presentations and the feedback they produce will serve as a pilot for this document. A final version of the policy advice will then be developed on the basis of it.

The evidence based policy advice delivered by TERRA II will therefore be based upon three significant strands. It will be derived from an updated literature review, which will reflect the state of the art of academic knowledge on policy around radicalisation. It will deliver blueprints of at least four, potentially six models of best practice which are considered by experts in this field to be functioning optimally and delivering a significant positive impact. And finally, it will draw upon the expertise of the partners in the TERRA consortium and advisory board to refine this advice and deliver it in a format which can be most helpful. It will promote strategies which support prevention and the link between successful prevention and de-radicalisation strategies. Its focus will be upon the transferability and cross – border applicability of these

strategies, so that other European countries are able to profit from the expertise within the TERRA network.

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